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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A STUDY ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REGIONALISM WITHIN THE 
(MENA) REGION AS A VEHICLE OF ACHIEVING ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 
 
By 
 
Haytham Mohammed Abu-Zeid 
 
Along the path of global economic integration, the world regions did witness a 
variety of enabling factors toward better and more suitable consolidation within the 
world economy. On one hand, the multilateral framework under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have provided a traditional empowerment factor especially for developed 
regions. Moreover, through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), global multinational 
corporations have played a major role in fostering global economic integration via the 
creation of international production networks and global supply chains. Besides, 
improving physical and digital infrastructure investment have reduced trade and 
logistics costs, thus encouraging the emergence of clusters of manufacturing firms and 
supplier networks. 
On the other hand, regional integration has recently been tackled by several 
regions as an attractive alternative path towards economic integration both intra-
regions and extra-regions as well. The acknowledgment of the link among gradual 
trade liberalization, regionalism and economic prosperity has stimulated most regions 
to become more engaged in regional integration. 
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While there is huge heterogeneity on this front, a combination of both 
economic and political considerations has been dominating behind regional 
integration in many (most) parts of the world. Regional integration is considered as a 
major factor of the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) trade strategies. 
Movements to integrate regionally could be traced back as earlier than many other 
developing regions in the world. 
Accordingly, the paper research question is about "How significant is 
regionalism within the (MENA) region as a vehicle of achieving economic 
integration?". It aims at examining how feasible is regional integration in terms of its 
achievements, ongoing efforts and the way ahead. The paper views regionalism as an 
alternative instrument –among others- of enabling the region to get integrated. 
Moreover, the paper assumes that any consideration of regional integration should 
navigate through the existing patchwork of analysis regarding this phenomenon.  
In this regard, the paper is organized in three main parts, where part one 
provides a broad overview of economic integration in general and regional integration 
in particular. Part two discusses the main distinct features of the (MENA) region 
regional integration process. Building on the findings of the preceding parts, part three 
lists the main concluding remarks and suggestions for better utilization of 
regionalism.  
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Preface: 
As the impact of economic integration is now occurring so rapidly that 
national barriers are increasingly becoming so artificial. This process of 
globalization within the economic domain has not always proceeded smoothly, 
nor has it always benefited all whom have been affected. However, despite 
occasional interruptions such as those following economic crises or during war 
times, the degree of economic integration among different countries around the 
world has generally been rising. 
It has been argued that three fundamental factors have affected the 
process of economic globalization, and are likely to continue driving it in the 
future. First, improvements in the technology of transportation and 
communication have reduced the costs of transporting goods, services, and 
factors of production, enabling communicating economically useful knowledge 
and technology. Second, the tastes of individuals and societies have generally, but 
not universally, favored taking advantage of the opportunities provided by 
declining costs of transportation and communication, through increasing 
economic integration. Third, public policies have significantly influenced the 
character and pace of economic integration, although not always in the direction 
of increasing economic integration.1 
The objective of the first chapter is to depict one of the most rising 
features of the context of economic integration, .i.e. the growing landscape of 
regionalism. In doing so, we firstly, try to highlight the different forms (stages) of 
economic integration. Secondly, a brief updated comparison is provided between 
                                                 
1 Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global Economic Integration, p10-11, 2000. 
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past versus current economic integration waves. Thirdly, an elaboration of 
Regional Trade Agreements' (RTAs) trends and characteristics is listed. 
Fourthly, a realistic analysis is provided regarding the incentives (motivations) 
underpinning a country's decision to enter a (RTA) when a multilateral free 
trade agreement is available. Finally, the chapter ends up by trying to answer the 
question of whether regionalism is a "stumbling block" or a "stepping stone" to 
multilateralism.    
Chapter One: Economic Integration Between Theory and Practice 
In the most general sense, economic integration (sometimes 
referred to as trade or market integration) denotes the process whereby 
the economic barriers between two or more economies are eliminated. 
To a great extent, it involves specific policy decisions by governments 
designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange of goods, 
services, capital and people, whereas other studies treat it as emanating 
from the natural forces of proximity, income and policy convergence.2 
          The economic integration process is often represented as a staged 
process, going from a preferential trade area to a full economic union. 
The most obvious example of this process is the European Union (EU), 
which has evolved from a collection of autarkical nations to become fully 
integrated. Although it is relatively rare that relationship between 
countries follows such a precise pattern, the market forces set in motion 
at one stage will properly create spillover effects to the next stage.  
 
                                                 
2  United Nations University, Programme for Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Introducing 
Regional Integration. See Web site: http://ocw.unu.edu 
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1.1 Forms (Stages) of Economic Integration:   
 (a) Free Trade Area (FTAs)3 
The first level of formal economic integration is the establishment 
of free trade area (FTA) or preferential trade agreement (PTA). (FTAs) 
eliminate import tariffs as well as import quotas among signatory 
countries. These agreements could be limited to a few sectors or could 
encompass all aspects of international trade. (FTAs) can also include 
formal mechanisms to resolve trade disputes. The North America Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) is an example of such an arrangement. 
Aside from a commitment to a reciprocal trade liberalization 
schedule, (FTAs) place few limitations on member states. Although 
(FTAs) may contain provisions in these areas if the signatory countries 
agree to do so, no further harmonization of regulations, standards and 
economic policies are required, nor are the free movement of capital and 
labour necessary parts of a free trade agreement. Moreover, (FTAs) 
signatory countries also retain independent trade policy with all 
countries outside the agreement.  
However, in order for an (FTA) to function properly, member countries 
must establish rules of origin for all third-party goods entering the free trade 
area. Goods produced within the free trade area (and subject to the agreement) 
may across borders tariff-free, but rules of origin requirements must be met to 
                                                 
3 Lecture Notes, Professor Jong Bum Kim, Understanding FTA Policy: Theory and Practice, 
Summer Course 2007, KDI School of Public Policy & Management.  
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prove that the goods were in fact produced in the exporting country. In the 
absence of rules of origin, third-party countries seeking trade access to the (FTA) 
will choose the path of least resistance – the country where they face the lowest 
opposing tariff- in order to gain effective entry to the entire (FTA) region. 
(b) Customs Union (CU)4  
A customs union (CU) builds on a free trade area. Additional to removing 
internal barriers to trade, it also requires participating countries to harmonize 
their external trade policy. This includes establishing a common external tariff 
and import quotas on products entering the region from third-party countries, 
as well as possibly establishing common trade remedy policies such as anti-
dumping and countervailing measures.  
A (CU) may also preclude the use of trade remedy mechanisms within the 
union. Members of a (CU) also typically negotiate any multilateral trade 
initiative such as the World Trade Organization as a single bloc. Countries with 
an established (CU) no longer require rules of origin, since any product entering 
the (CU) area would be subject to the same tariff rates and/or import quotas 
regardless of the point of entry.  
The elimination of the need for rules of origin is the main benefit of a 
(CU) over an (FTA). Maintaining rules of origin requires extensive 
documentation by all (FTA) member countries, as well as enforcement of those 
rules at borders within the (FTA). This is a costly process and may lead to 
                                                 
4   Rolf Mirus and Nataliya Rylska, Economic Integration:  Free Trade Areas vs. Customs 
Unions, Western Centre for Economic Research, 2001. 
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disputes over interpretation of the rules as well as other delays. A (CU) would 
result in significant administrative cost savings and efficiency gains.  
In order to gain the benefits of (CU) member countries would have to 
surrender some degree of policy freedom, specifically the ability to set 
independent trade policy. By extension, because of the increased importance of 
trade and economic measures as foreign policy tools, (CU) place some limitations 
on independent foreign policy as well.  
(c) Common Market (CM)  
"A common market represents a major step towards significant economic 
integration. In addition to containing the provisions of a (CU), a (CM) removes all 
barriers to the mobility of people, capital and other resources within the area in 
question, as well as eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade, such as the regulatory 
treatment of product standards".5  
Establishing a (CM) typically requires significant policy harmonization in 
a number of areas. Free movement of labour, for example, necessitates an 
agreement on worker qualifications and certifications. A (CM) is also typically 
associated with a broad convergence of fiscal and monetary policies due to the 
increased economic interdependence within the region, and the effect that one 
member country's policies may have on other member countries. This 
necessarily places more severe limitations on member countries' ability to pursue 
independent economic policies.  
The principal advantage of establishing a (CM) is the expected gains in 
economic efficiency. With unfettered (free) mobility, labour and capital can more 
                                                 
5  Stages of Economic Integration, From Autarky to Economic Union. See Web Site: 
http://library.thinkquest.org 
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easily respond to economic signals within the (CM), resulting in a more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
(d) Economic Union6 
On the scale of economic integration, while an (FTA) represents the 
lightest degree of integration, an economic union embodies the deepest form. An 
economic Union adds to a (CM) the need to harmonize a number of key policy 
areas. Most notably, economic unions require formally coordinated monetary 
and fiscal policies as well as labour market, regional development, 
transportation and industrial policies. Since all countries would essentially share 
the same economic space, it would be counter-productive to operate divergent 
policies in those areas. 
An economic union frequently includes the use of a common currency and 
a unified monetary policy. Eliminating exchange rate uncertainty improves the 
functioning of an economic union, by allowing trade to follow economically 
efficient paths without being unduly affected by exchange rate considerations. 
Moreover, supranational institutions would be required to regulate commerce 
within the union to ensure uniform application of the rules. These laws would 
still be administrated at the national level, but countries would abdicate (give-
up) individual control in this area.     
• General Remarks:-  
? Since countries are free to negotiate economic integration 
agreements as they believe fit, in practice, formal agreements 
                                                 
6  Ibid.  
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rarely fall neatly into one of the above mentioned forms (stages). A 
situation which may lead to some confusion regarding both the 
terminologies and the conditions of economic integration. 
? For example, in the case of Canada the country is part of an (FTA) 
with the United States and Mexico. However, the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also includes provisions that 
partially liberate the flow of labour and capital in the region – a 
primary characteristic of a (CU). In addition, Canada has in the 
past pushed to curtail (restrict) the use of trade remedy measures 
within North America. While this would represent a desire to 
advance one aspect of North American integration, the next formal 
step – a (CU) - does not appear to be a policy priority at that time. 
? A further more supporting example comes from the European 
model of economic integration, it has been argued that the 
European Economic Community (EEC) skipped the first formal 
stage of economic integration – namely (FTA) – and started 
directly as a (CU).           
1.2 Past versus Current Global Economic Integration 
Some analysts argue that the remarkable economic changes that we do 
observe currently are being driven by the same basic forces, and are having 
similar effects as in the past. Perhaps, most important, technological advances 
continue to play an important role in facilitating global integration7. For 
example, dramatic improvements in supply-chain management, made possible 
                                                 
7 Ben S. Bernanke, Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposium, Wyoming, August 2006.       
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by advances in communication and computer technologies, have significantly 
reduced the costs of coordinating production among globally distributed suppliers. 
The critical role of government policies in supporting, or at least 
permitting, global economic integration, is another similarity between the past 
and the present. Progress in trade liberalization has continued in recent decades 
-though not always at a steady pace- as the recent Doha Round negotiations demonstrate.  
Moreover, the institutional framework supporting global trade, most 
importantly the World Trade Organization, has expanded and strengthened 
over time. Regional frameworks and agreements, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union's "single market," 
have also promoted trade. Government restrictions on international capital flows 
have generally declined, and the "soft infrastructure" supporting those flows has 
improved, in part through international cooperation. 8  
A further similarity in current pattern of economic integration in 
paralleling with past one is the social and political opposition to rapid economic 
integration. As in the past, much of the current opposition is driven by the 
distributional impact of changes in the pattern of production, but other concerns 
have been expressed as well, such as the effects of global economic integration on 
the environment or on the developing countries.9  
On the other hand, taking into consideration the latest economic changes 
worldwide, we could identify some distinctions between current economic 
integration waves compared with past ones. First, in terms of the scale and pace, 
                                                 
8 Ben S. Bernanke, Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposium, Wyoming, August 2006. 
 
9 Ibid.    
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today's economic integration pattern is one that characterized as unparalleled or 
unprecedented.  
For example, in recent years, global merchandise exports have been above 
20 percent of world gross domestic product, compared with about 8 percent in 
1913 and less than 15 percent as recently as 1990. 
The following figure (figure no.1) shows that world merchandise exports 
recorded annual percentage changes of (6.5%, 8.5% and 6%) for years (2005, 
2006 and 2007) respectively, compared with annual percentage changes of (3%, 
3.5% and 3.5%) recorded by world GDP for the same three years. During the 
period (2000-2007), exports on average increased by (2.7) percentage points 
faster than real gross domestic product.  
(Figure no.1) 
Volume of World Merchandise exports & Gross Domestic Product, 
2000-2007 
    Source: International Trade Statistics-2008, World Trade Organization.  
A second distinctive characteristic of current waves of economic 
integration might be the increasing intra-trade (within regions) share of world 
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trade over extra-trade's share (between regions). Since 2000, intra-trade's share 
of world trade has fluctuated between (55% - 58%).  
However, the following figure (figure no.2) shows relatively large 
differences have occurred in the growth of trade within regions, with North 
America and Asia showing a relative balanced growth between intra and extra-
regional trade. Europe's intra-trade is much faster than its external trade due to 
the deepening of its economic integration, while South and Central America, 
Africa and Middle East have recorded higher growth in extra-regional exports 
than in intra.10  
(Figure no.2) 
Intra- and Extra Regional Merchandise exports, 2007 
 
 Source: International Trade Statistics-2008, World Trade Organization. 
A further remarkable difference between current versus past economic 
integration is that the traditional distinction between the core (hub) and the 
periphery (margin) is becoming increasingly less relevant, as the mature 
                                                 
10 International Trade Statistics -2008, World Trade Organization. 
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industrial economies (mainly North America and European Union) and the 
emerging-market economies (China, India and Brazil) become more integrated 
and interdependent. Notably, the sixtieth,  the seventieth and the eightieth 
patterns, in which the core exported manufactures to the periphery in exchange 
for commodities, no longer hold, as an increasing share of world manufacturing 
capacity is now found in emerging markets.  11  
The latest development within trade in services has also distinguished 
current waves of economic integration compared to past ones. In 2007, the value 
of trade in commercial services increased at a faster rate (18%) than trade in 
goods (15%) for the first time in five years. This was mainly due to the 
expanding international supply of many services and to the increase in 
transportation prices12. The following figure (figure no.3) shows that trade in 
services in 2007 was highly concentrated in North America, Asia and Europe 
capturing (15%, 29% and 50%) respectively of total trade in services. 
(Figure no.3) 
Total Commercial Services Trade, 2007 
 
   Source: International Trade Statistics-2008, World Trade Organization. 
                                                 
11 International Trade Statistics -2008, World Trade Organization. 
 
12 Ibid.  
12 
 
1.3 Regional Trade Agreements' Trends and Characteristics 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are preferential trade agreements 
between/among two or more nations within certain area (region), in order to 
reduce tariffs and other trade restrictions. (RTAs) come in different forms such 
as (FTAs), (CUs) and Partial Scope agreements. The legal frameworks for such 
arrangements rely mainly on GATT Article (24) XXIV –for agreements related 
to trade in goods- and GATS Article (5) V – for agreements related to trade in 
services. Moreover, a wide range of preferential arrangements finds its 
legitimacy within the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which became 
part of the 1979 "Enabling Clause".  
Those frameworks ensured to a great extent the transformation 
(movement) of international trade disciplines away from the umbrella of 
multilateral trading system (GATT and its successor WTO). Moreover, and most 
importantly, those legal frameworks of preferentiality have marked an explicit 
forego (waive) over the heart of the GATT, which is the principle of "Non-
Discrimination". This principle is best characterized by both the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause and the National Treatment provisions, 
principally embodied in Article 1.  
The (MFN) clause was regarded as the central organizing rule of the 
(GATT and WTO). It holds that the best tariff and non-tariff conditions 
extended to any contracting party of the GATT had to be automatically and 
unconditionally extended to every other contracting party.  
Yet nearly five decades after the founding of the GATT, (MFN) is no 
longer the rule; it is almost the exception. Certainly, much trade between the 
13 
 
major economies is still conducted on an (MFN) basis. However, what has been 
termed the "Spaghetti Bowl" of (FTAs), (CUs), (CMs) and an endless assortment 
of preferential trade deals has almost reached the point where (MFN) is an 
exceptional treatment. Certainly, the term might now be better defined as (LFN), 
Least-Favoured Nation Treatment. 13 
Turning to the causes of such transformation from multilateralism 
towards regionalism, the sluggish progress in multilateral trade negotiations 
under the Doha Development Round appears to be the most recent common 
plausible justification accelerating the rush to forge (RTAs). Moreover, the 
proponents of (RTAs) set a variety of justifications for action outside the 
multilateral system. Frequently, the motivations that drive governments toward 
bilateral or regional arrangements reflect clear frustration with the multilateral 
atmosphere. 
 Therefore, our purpose here is to list the main trends and characteristics 
of both (RTAs) in force and under negotiation. Besides, it is worth noting that 
while we are trying to examine the landscape of (RTAs), it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that it is not necessarily the number of (RTAs) in which a 
country participates that is of significance, but the proportion of world trade 
that such (RTAs) cover. In other words, an agreement between two large 
economies is likely to account for a much larger share of world trade than 
several (FTAs) among small or less developed economies. 14  
                                                 
13 Thomas Cottier, The Erosion of Non-Discrimination: Stern Warning without True Remedies, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 2005.  
 
14 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
Agreements, World Trade Organization, Discussion Paper No.8 
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1.3.1 Main Trends:    
 According to (Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto Fiorentino),15 since early 2005 
four main (RTAs) related trends are apparent as follow:  
I) Countries across the world, including those traditionally reliant on multilateral 
trade liberalization, are increasingly making (RTAs) the centerpiece of their 
commercial policy. For some countries (RTAs) are on par with multilateral trade 
objectives. However, for many others (RTAs) have become the priority.  
II) (RTAs) are becoming increasingly complex, in many cases establishing 
regulatory trade regimes which go beyond multilaterally agreed trade regulations.  
III) Reciprocal preferential agreements between developed-developing countries 
are on the increase pointing to a decreasing reliance by some developing countries 
on non-reciprocal systems of preferences. Relevantly, the emergence of preferential 
agreements among key developing countries may be a strong evidence of a 
strengthening of the so called "South-South Trading Patterns".  
IV) (RTAs) dynamics show a general pattern of expansion and consolidation, 
where on the one hand we are witnessing a proliferation of cross-regional (RTAs) 
accounting for a large proportion of the total increase in (RTAs). On the other 
hand, regional trading blocks on a continent-wide scale are in the making.  
The surge in (RTAs) has continued unabated since the early 1990s (figure 
no.4). A sum of 421 (RTAs) have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to 
December 2008. Of these, 324 (RTAs) were notified under Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 29 under the Enabling Clause; and 68 under Article 
V of the GATS. At that same date, 230 agreements were in force.16 
Verifying the compatibility of (RTAs) notified under (GATT) Article 
XXIV and (GATS) Article V with the existing (WTO) rules on (RTAs) is 
                                                 
  15  Ibid.    
16  World Trade Organization, Trade Topics, RTAs Gateway, www.wto.org. 
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assigned to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). However, 
the committee did witness limited achievement so far in examining the 
consistency of the (RTAs) notified to the (WTO), due to various political and 
legal obstacles. Moreover, the (CRTA) has also been unable to carry out 
effectively its functions of reviewing and appraising the implementation of (RTAs). 
If we take into account (RTAs) which are in force but have not been 
notified, those signed but not yet in force, those currently being negotiated, and 
those in the proposal stage, we arrive at a figure of close to 400 (RTAs) which are 
scheduled to be implemented by 2010. Of these (RTAs), free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for over (90%), while customs 
unions (CUs) account for less than (10 %).17 
(Figure no. 4) 
Growth in the number of regional trade agreements, 1958–2007 
 
Source: World Bank, Economic Development and Prospects 2008.  
 
 
                                                 
17  Ibid.  
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1.3.2 (RTAs) Characteristics18 
According to (Crawford & Fiorentino 2005) the predominance of (FTAs) 
over (CUs) is properly due to the fact that they are faster to conclude and 
require a lower degree of policy coordination among the parties, since in an 
(FTA) each party maintains its own trade policy vis-à-vis third parties. (CUs) on 
the other hand, require the establishment of a common external tariff and 
harmonization of external trade policies, implying a greater loss of autonomy 
over the parties' commercial policies and longer complex negotiations and 
implementation periods.  
Furthermore, "the majority of (FTAs) are concerned with strategic market 
access often unbound by geographical considerations, while in (CUs) geographical 
considerations play a pivotal role in defining the objective of economic integration 
among parties concerned. As for membership in partial scope agreements their 
limited trade coverage, poor implementation record and scarce visibility, makes 
them much less attractive to countries, including developing ones, which are 
committed to comprehensive trade liberalization"19.  
In terms of their scope and depth, (RTAs) differ considerably with some 
providing for the exchange of tariff preferences on a limited range of products, 
and others being highly comprehensive in coverage and including wide range of 
trade regulatory regimes. Given the requirements prescribed by the (WTO) 
provisions on (RTAs), partial scope agreements falling under the legal cover of 
                                                 
18 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
Agreements, World Trade Organization, Discussion Paper No.8 
  
19 Ibid.  
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the Enabling Clause concern exclusively agreements among developing countries 
and in most cases they tend to have limited product coverage. 
 (FTAs) and (CUs) falling under the legal cover of GATT Article XXIV 
and/or GATS Article V for trade in services, are comprehensive in scope and 
especially the most recent agreements often go beyond the (WTO) regulatory 
framework to include provisions on investment, competition, intellectual 
property, environment and labor among others. As noted in a recent study by 
the World Bank 20, the inclusion of such provisions is especially marked in 
(RTAs) among developed and developing countries, perhaps reflecting the 
interests that developed economies place in such issues.   
Moreover, it is worth noting that the so called "Singapore Issues" 21 which 
were rejected at the (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2004 are being 
included in many preferential agreements, including those between developing – 
developed country partners.  
Accordingly, it should be clarified that although those agreements (among 
developing – developed country partners) are often referred to in the literature 
as (WTO) plus agreements, such categorization should not necessarily be 
interpreted in a positive light. For example, while agreements restricting the 
imposition of anti-dumping measure on intra-(RTA) trade may be considered as 
(WTO) plus, the same cannot be said for agreements containing provisions on 
intellectual property which are more restrictive than what is provided for under 
the (TRIPS).  
                                                 
20 See " The World Bank Annual Report- Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, 
Regionalism and Development 2005".  
21    Trade Facilitation, Investment, Government Procurement and Competition. 
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1.4 Regionalism versus Multilateralism, Incentives and Motivations 22 
When it comes to identify why countries do seek regional trade 
agreements, a wide range of motivations and considerations would appear as a 
realistic applicable justification. Some countries see (RTAs) as providing 
underpinnings to strategic alliances, while others (especially smaller countries) 
view (RTAs) with larger partners as a way of obtaining more security for their 
access to larger countries' markets (as in the Canada – U.S. Free Trade Agreement).  
Analysts argue that some countries use regional (beside multilateral) 
agreements to further support their domestic policy reforms (as Mexico in North 
America Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). Another group of countries use 
(RTAs) as potential influence towards subsequent multilateral negotiations 
rounds. This part aims at highlighting the various incentives and motivations 
behind countries objectives to undergo (RTAs). 
1.4.1 Traditional Trade Gains 
It seems to be that the most conventional objective behind a country's 
decision to tackle any trade negotiation is the idea that, enhancement in market 
access for all interested parties would further be achieved through reciprocal 
exchanges of concessions on trade barriers. The inspiration of reaping trade 
benefits induced by regional integration was a major determinant behind the 
foundation of the European Community (EC) in the late 1950s, although clearly 
not the central objective. 
Analysts argue that the justifications for participating in a regional 
negotiation rather than any other type, including multilateral, that the chances 
                                                 
22  John Whalley, "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?" 1996 
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of success are seen more higher than any other type due to the limited number of 
negotiating parties, in addition to a proper prior history of frustrated negotiation 
rounds on the multilateral level. However, according to (Viner 1950)  it should be 
noted that traditional trade gains resulting from concluding (RTAs) or (CUs)   
may not be fully utilized by signatories, as trade diversion losses may 
overshadow trade creation gains; that is, trade may also be diverted to higher 
cost, less efficient suppliers within the integrating area.  
1.4.2 Strengthening Domestic Policy Reform 
A much common objective among countries' objectives in seeking either 
bilateral (regional) or multilateral negotiation, is the idea of strengthening 
domestic policy reform. It has been argued that such objective was the 
centerpiece behind the Mexican negotiating team on (NAFTA). Accordingly, the 
Mexican delegation did show a little concern to ensure reciprocal concessions 
between them and their counterpart. 
On the other hand, the Mexicans were much more interested in offering  
one-sided concessions to superior negotiating partners with whom they hold 
partial negotiating influence as part of the bilateral negotiation. This objective 
stakes to the idea that a regional agreement could support domestic policy 
reform and make it further achievable, that is by binding the country to the 
masthead of an international regional agreement, any potential setback of 
domestic policy reform turns out to be  more difficult to occur.  
1.4.3 Increased Multilateral Bargaining Power   
The idea of this motivation was shared by the countries involved in the 
formation of the (EC) in the late 1950s. The rationale behind that was European 
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countries separately would pose inadequate influence in a negotiation with the 
United States on the multilateral level. However, opportunities to raise European 
countries' leverage seem more attainable, if they would act cooperatively in 
adopting a common trade policy. 
Moreover, evidences show that Latin American arrangements, especially   
(Mercosur), have been targeting regionalism for the purpose of increasing 
negotiating power, where the thought  has been that clusters of countries do hold 
more influence in accession negotiations to (NAFTA) than would independent 
countries do. Similar views have also been there in Eastern European Countries 
during the early 1990s, where the argument was that a preceding regional talks 
among Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary would greatly increase their 
leverage in their accession negotiations to (EC).   
1.4.4 Guarantees of Access  
A further recent objective spotted in small – large country trade 
negotiations, is the use of (RTAs) by smaller countries to ensure market access to 
larger countries' market within the designated region. Referring to (NAFTA), 
Canadians were so keen about securing sustainable market access for their 
products, by ensuring certain forms of exception from the use of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties by the US producers. Canada also sought special 
bilateral arrangements that would limit the application of (US) safeguard 
measures to Canada, embodying a typical form of escaping from the principle of 
(MFN).  
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1.5 Is Regionalism a "Stumbling Block" or a "Stepping Stone" 
to Multilateralism?    
Based on the above listed analysis, in addition to the recent implications 
in the arena of international trade, I do believe to a great extent that trying to 
answer the previous question would lead us partially outside the pure domain of 
international trade policy theories. In other words, great deals of political 
economy approaches have been conducted trying to tackle the same question.  
This question was first raised by (Jagdish Bhagwati)23. In his writings, he 
has provided several reasons why regionalism might not lead to global free trade. 
Arguments leading to Bhagwati's conclusions on this issue have been formally 
modeled by (Levy-1997) and (Krishna-1998). (Levy-1997) found that bilateral 
agreements between countries similar in endowments result in the subsequent 
blocking of multilateral trade agreements. He also concluded that bilateral 
agreements can never increase the political support for multilateralism.24  
 (Krishna-1998) addressed the same issue in a political economy set up 
where profits get a much higher weight than other components of welfare in the 
government's objective function (political – support function approach). He 
found greater political support for trade – diverting bilateral agreements 
(regionalism) than for trade – crating ones. Such agreements can also make 
previously feasible multilateral agreements politically infeasible.    
                                                 
23  Jagdish Natwarlal Bhagwati (born July 26, 1934) is an Indian-American economist and a University 
Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He is well known 
for his research in International Trade and for his advocacy of free trade. 
 
24   Devashish Mitra, Political Economy of Trade Policy, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 
2005.  
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Besides, (Albertin-2008) used a similar perspective to conduct a political 
economy analysis of the incentives underpinning a country's decision to enter an 
(RTA) when a multilateral free trade agreement is available. Furthermore, 
(Albertin-2008) highlighted the implications of embracing regionalism for the 
incentives to pursue multilateral trade liberalization. The paper developed a 
model through which a country has to distinguish between entering a regional 
trade agreement or a multilateral free trade agreement. Assuming that the 
policymaker setting his/her trade policy taking into consideration not only 
aggregate social welfare, but also the pressure applied by industrial interests 
group, the paper formalized the choice between the two alternative trade 
agreements.25 
The analysis depicted a situation through which the policymaker faces a 
trade-off in his/her choice of trade policy, since industrial interest group will 
provide political contributions to enter the regional trade agreement, while a 
higher aggregate social welfare could be achieved under the multilateral free 
trade agreement. Accordingly, a formal condition was derived under which the 
regional trade agreement will be preferred to the multilateral free trade 
agreement, showing that the policymaker's choice is a political equilibrium that 
balances pro-regionalism and pro-multilateralism forces. 
Moreover, (Albertin-2008) pointed out that policymaker will choose to 
enter the regional trade agreement if the political contribution the interest group 
is willing to provide at least offsets the loss in the aggregate social welfare. In 
particular, the paper showed that if the distortions in the policymaking process 
are sufficiently strong and trade barriers against non members are sufficiently 
                                                 
25  Albertin Giorgia. Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political economy choice, IMF Working Paper 
WP/08/65, March-2008. 
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low, the regional trade agreement will be preferred to the multilateral free trade 
agreement. Therefore, the paper concluded that a country's decision to enter a 
regional trade agreement when a multilateral free trade agreement is available is 
driven by the extent of distortions in the policy making process, the lobbying 
activity of the organized industrial group, and the extent of trade barriers.  
Chapter Two: Regionalism and (MENA)'s Economic Integration   
After trying to examine the various features of global economic 
integration, in the light of the growing phenomenon of regionalism and their 
consequences over international trade, it would be of greater importance to zoom 
in more over a specific prospect of regionalism to view how dose the situation 
look like on a narrower scale.  
 In this regard, regionalism has been considered as a major component of 
the modern history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region's 
economic integration process. Many literatures argue that the (MENA) region 
preceded several areas –both developed and developing ones- in tackling 
economic integration as a unique path towards its evolution. Moreover, economic 
integration within the (MENA) region experienced a wide range of approaches 
ranging among regionalism, multilateralism and bilateralism.  
Analysts argue that the (MENA) region do pose many precious 
determinants for a successful realistic economic integration. In other words, the 
similarity in cultural aspects (religion–language–habits), the availability of 
natural resources and the strategic location are believed to be further facilitating 
past, present and future plans of economic integration.  
However, taking into consideration the progress achieved so far, many 
literatures agree that the (MENA) region do lack serious improvements within 
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its economic integration path to further become more effective in the 
international arena in general and the world trade in particular. Such literatures 
–generally- stake to the slow motion adopted by the (MENA) region countries in 
fulfilling their mandates of economic integration. Moreover, the region is 
experiencing one of the most unbalanced developments among its various blocks. 
Besides, the existing policies within the region reveal tangible barriers towards 
true liberalization of international trade.  
Accordingly, this chapter aims at capturing as much analysis as possible 
over regionalism and economic integration processes in the (MENA) region. In 
doing so, a descriptive evolution is listed regarding the different stages (phases) 
of the region's economic integration via regionalism, then an analytical 
assessment is listed regarding the region's opportunities and challenges.     
   2.1 Main Characteristics:  
The World Bank's definition of the (MENA) region includes: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen.26 From this list Malta will be 
excluded, which has been a member of the EU since May 1, 2004; Turkey, that 
focuses its economic integration efforts on Europe; and Iran due to 
unavailability of information. On the other hand, Israel might be included from 
time to time during the analysis due to its involvement in some of both applied 
and ongoing regional integration; this is despite the obvious barrier to regional 
integration posed by the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.  
                                                 
26  See World Bank Website, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT. 
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2.1.1 Background (Overview): 
Economic integration within the (MENA) region in general and Arab 
countries in particular has been on the agenda of the region's policy makers and 
intellectuals for more than fifty years. Generally speaking, the region did share 
other parts (areas) of the world a wide range of reasons (forces) leading to the 
launch of its economic integration process. For the Arab countries, there has 
been a common belief that the creation of an allied Arab economic bloc would 
support the region bargaining power in an increasingly polarized world. 
Moreover, Arab economic integration was highly perceived as an enabling 
mechanism for the region's internationalization; increasing interaction with the 
world economy. 27 
During the last five decades the Arab countries had witnessed a period of 
trials and errors in creating a truly united, economically integrated area. 
However, after fifty years of attempts Arab economic integration remains 
elusive. On the contrary, the European economic integration, which began 
nearly around the same time, succeeded in translating the vision of its members 
into reality. 
2.1.2 Basic Economic and Development Indicators: 
The (MENA) region is characterized with a clear variation among its 
economies in several aspects, the relative sizes of the national economies range 
from Djibouti's 0.8 Billion US$ and Jordan's 16 Billion US$ to Algeria's 134 
                                                 
27  Ahmad Galal and Bernard Hoekman, "Arab Economic Integration between hope and reality" 
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 2003.  
26 
 
Billion US$ and Saudi Arabia's 375 Billion US$, with several steps in between.28  
Moreover, variation also extends to include the region's (GPD) per capita 
distribution, from very high (UAE – 49,116 US$, Kuwait – 46,638 US$, Israel – 
24,405 US$, Saudi Arabia – 22,053 US$) to low (Djibouti – 1,965 US$, Yemen – 
2,262 US$, Morocco – 3,915 US$, Egypt – 4,953 US$, Jordan – 4,654 US$).29 
 These disparities in themselves demonstrate the low degree of existing 
regional economic integration.  Moreover, it is important to note that none of the 
(MENA) states are classified by the (UNDP) as Low Human Development states, 
with only Djibouti and Yemen are classified as Least-Developed Countries.30  
A major economic feature of the (MENA) region is the abundance of 
natural resources, where most of the oil reserves are concentrated in Arab gulf 
countries; Saudi Arabia alone accounts for almost one-quarter of the earth's oil 
resources. However, the region's economies don't share the same feature of oil 
and gas abundance. Consequently, the region is divided into major oil-exporters, 
in which more than 90% of total exports are energy resources such as gulf 
countries, and oil-importers such as Jordan and Morocco.31 
 Accordingly, such features are believed to be core determinants in many 
movements of economic integration within the region, where oil-exporters 
became heavily dependant on oil revenues, leading to an increasing vulnerability 
towards dramatic changes within energy market (oil prices), while oil-importers 
became more worried about securing the needs of their development goals. Thus, 
                                                 
28 GDP data is from 2007,based on World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, 2008 Economic 
Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness, 2009.        
29 UNDP, Human Development Statistics available on the UNDP Website at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics. 
30  Fakhri, Images of the Arab World and Middle East: Debates about Development and Regional 
Integration Sept. 2007.  
31 BP Statistical Review of the World Energy, 2007. http://www.tsl.uu.se & 
www.bp.com/statisticalreview 
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both parties perceived economic integration as an urgent resort for their 
prosperity.  
On the other hand, a major developmental feature of the (MENA) region 
is the high rate of population growth, where the region witnessed an influx 
increase from an estimated 100 million people in the 1950s to almost 300 million 
today. However, a further distinction within the region should be between labor 
abundant economies and labor-importing economies. A distinction which also 
believed further facilitated and encouraged several forms (movements) of 
economic integration in the region.  
2.2 Regionalism in the (MENA) Region:  
2.2.1 Regional Economic Integration (Origin and Evolution) 32 
Traditionally, the Arab League, founded in 1945, has been the main entity 
for handling inter-Arab cooperation. Regionalization of economic relations 
could easily be identified within the Arab League's mandate. The purpose of 
the Arab League was "to draw closer the relations between member states 
and coordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close 
collaboration among them", in addition to the purpose of a close cooperation 
in economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, 
agriculture and industry. 33   
The (MENA) region witnessed several attempts of economic integration 
under the umbrella of the Arab League. However, such attempts are argued 
to fail in clearly translating its objectives into outcomes, which would 
                                                 
32  Broude, Tomer. "Regional Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa Region", Jan 
2009.   
33  Article 2(a) of the Pact of the Arab League States.  
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eventually result in either an Arab Free Trade Area or an Arab Common 
Market (ACM).  
The first attempt took place in 1950 under the Treaty for Joint Defense 
and Economic Cooperation, where both security and political concerns at 
that time are said to overweight economic ones. In 1953, the second initiative 
was launched under the Convention on the Facilitation of Trade Exchange 
and the Regulation of Transit Trade. It included some custom-free 
commitments relating to specific livestock and agricultural products and 
limited preferences on specified industrial products.34 
Analysts argue that the creation of the Agreement on Arab Economic 
Unity (AAEU) was a major step along the evolution process of economic 
integration within the (MENA) region. This agreement was approved by the 
Economic Council of the Arab League in 1957. It was signed in 1962 and 
entered into force in 1964. Moreover, it is argued that the ambitious language 
held by the (AAEU) aimed at the establishment of a complete economic union 
among the Arab League members on a gradual basis, where the free 
movement of both persons and capital to play an effective role. 
The creation of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) in 1964 was 
the starting point towards the fulfillment of the (AAEU) goal. As a traditional 
common step the (CAEU) managed to promote agreements on the avoidance 
of double taxation and other cooperative economic agreements among its 
members. 
In 1964, under the (CAEU) Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria agreed 
to establish an Arab Common Market, an initiative which was supposed to 
                                                 
34   Ibid.  
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gradually remove quantitative restrictions and tariffs toward the 
accomplishment of a common market during the 1970s. However, such an 
initiative encountered limited effectiveness due to autonomous exceptions and 
consecutive extensions of transitional periods. 35 
2.2.2 Sub-Regional Economic Integration  
Taking into consideration the failure of the large scale regional economic 
integration initiatives under the umbrella of the Arab League, parallel 
alternative waves of sub-regional initiatives were launched during the 
1980s.The failure of the early attempts of regional economic integration 
within the (MENA) region may be attributed to both political and economic 
reasons.   
For instance, the (ACM) was further weakened by a provision allowing 
member countries to list products to be exempted from the tariff and quota 
liberalization measures. Moreover, Egypt's membership of both the (CAEU) 
and the (ACM) was suspended when the country signed the "Camp David 
Accord" with Israel in 1979. In addition, borders among some countries were 
also closed from time to time due to political frictions.36 Besides, lack of 
economic incentives, political rivalries, absence of leadership interest and 
weak institutional frameworks appear to be considerable justifications.  
In this regard, the (MEAN) region did witness several sub-regional 
initiatives among its countries during the 1980s. These initiatives were 
created among countries which had either geographical proximity and/or 
                                                 
35  For a detailed description of the (ACM) early years, See Hershlay, "The Economic Structure of the  
Middle East" 1975, pp. 193-194.  
36  Rania S. Miniesy & Jaffery B. Nuget and Tarek M. Yousef, Trade Policy and Economic Integration 
in the Middle East and North Africa, Intra Regional Trade Integration in the Middle East P.42, 2005.  
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economic similarity, and were strongly related to share security concerns. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that a common motivation for almost all 
sub-regional economic integration initiatives within the region was the 
perception that both former and exiting trade flows at that time were below 
what would normally be expected. 
2.2.2.1The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
One of the most outstanding features of sub-regional initiatives within the 
(MENA) region was the creation of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf (GCC) in 1981. At that time, the Head of States of Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain announced their 
strong desire to further develop, extend and enhance their economic ties on solid 
foundations. A primary interesting feature of the (GCC) economic integration 
model, is that it embodies a typical implementation (reflection) of the theory of 
economic integration; in other words the (GCC) model started by the (FTA) in 
1983, passing through the (CU) in 2003, reaching the common market (CM) in 
2008.  
Empirical studies show that a package of economic objectives was highly 
dominating the creation of the (GCC); it includes stimulating trade relations 
among member states, maximizing member states' market size, achieving better 
allocation (utilization) of resources, elimination of transaction costs and risks 
associated with flexible exchange rates.  
On the other hand, a wide range of both political and strategic purposes 
appears to be further strong justifications for the creation of the (GCC). Such 
purposes contain the coordination integration and inter-connection between its 
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Member States so as to achieve unity among them; the deepening and 
strengthening of relations between their peoples in various fields; and the 
formulation of "similar regulations" in economic, educational and cultural 
fields. The (GCC) Charter established an unremarkable intergovernmental 
institutional structure, in which all substantive decisions require unanimity, and 
disputes are referred to an ad hoc Commission that refers its recommendations 
or opinions to the (GCC) Supreme Council which may act as it deems 
appropriate.37 
In 1983 the (GCC) launched the first formal form of its initiative, i.e. 
(FTA).  The (GCC-FTA) was mainly featured by exempting the industrial, 
agricultural goods and natural resources of the (GCC) States from customs 
duties and other similar duties, subject to presentation of a certificate of origin 
issued by the competent government authority in the exporting country. The 
(GCC-FTA) continued for almost twenty years until the end of 2002, when it was 
replaced by the (GCC-CU). Throughout the (FTA) period (1983-2002), the 
volume of Intra-(GCC) trade increased from less than US$ 6 billion in 1983 to 
some US$ 20 billion in 2002. 38 
Establishing the (GCC-CU) on January 1st 2003 was a second 
outstanding  shift along the (GCC) economic integration model, the (GCC-CU) 
was basically based on a common external tariff of 5% for all products from 
non-GCC countries, elimination of trade barriers, uniform import/export 
procedures and treatment of the geographical territory of the six member States 
as a single customs territory. Though the creation of the (GCC-CU) was a little 
                                                 
37  See Article 4 of the (GCC) Charter.  
38  See Article 10 of the (GCC) Charter.  
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bit late initiative, yet it was deemed as an advanced union in its legal terms and 
provisions, as Article (1) of the (GCC) New Economic Agreement - signed at 
Muscat Summit in December 2001- outlined the following basic principles of the 
(GCC-CU):39 
a)A Common External Tariff 
b)A Common Customs Laws  
c)Uniform customs procedures 
d)Single entry point where common duties are levied 
e)Intra-GCC movement of goods without tariff or non-tariff barriers 
f)National treatment of GCC goods 
 
Aiming at reaping the whole benefits provided by complete progressive 
economic integration, In January 2008, the (GCC) launched the (GCC-CM. It 
aimed at fulfilling the required procedures for the concept of "Economic 
Nationalization", through achieving equal treatment among (GCC) nationals in 
the following, but not limited to, economic and social fields:  
1. Movement and residence 
2. Work in private and government jobs 
3. Pension and social security 
4. Engagement in all professions and crafts 
5. Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities 
6. Real estate ownership 
7. Capital movement 
8. Tax treatment 
9. Stock ownership and formation of corporations 
10. Education, health and social services 
 
2.2.2.2 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) includes the following five states: 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The idea for the (AMU) could 
be stretched back by year 1964, when the conference of economic ministers of the 
                                                 
39  The Gulf Cooperation Council, formal website, see: http://www.gccsg.org  
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Maghreb countries in Tunisia led to the creation of the Maghreb Permanent 
Consultative Committee (CPCM). Despite the ambitious promising plans 
intended by the (CPCM), to further strengthen economic ties among its 
members, such plans failed to meet real response for more than 20 years. 40  
It was only until February 1989 when the (AMU) was agreed upon among 
the five Maghreb states. The (AMU) aimed at further liberalizing trade relations 
among its members through free movement of persons, good, services and 
capital. Moreover, the (AMU) future plans were to establish a (CU) in 1995 and a 
(CM) in 2000. However, political tensions among member states during the early 
1990s stood as a major obstacle against the fulfillment of such promising planed 
objectives. 41  
2.3 Recent Developments at the Regional level 
 Following the above listed sequence of economic integration pattern 
within the (MENA) region, and referring to the varies difficulties faced previous 
attempts at both the regional level and the sub-regional level, recently the 
(MENA) region in general, and the Arab economic agenda in particular, 
witnessed a double revival attempt at the regional level along its economic 
integration path. Such an attempt could be identified through two main 
initiatives, the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the Agadir 
Agreement.  
The (GAFTA) is an Arab League framework, its primary objective are 
mainly concerned with intra-regional- looking. Moreover, it aims at the 
inclusiveness of Arab League states beyond the (MENA) region. On the other 
                                                 
40  Ibid.  
41  Ibid.  
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hand, despite the fact that the Agadir Agreement being also formally open to 
accession of all Arab League states that are (GAFTA) members, it is more 
concerned with the Euro-Mediterranean field, where an additional accession 
requirement is the existence of an (FTA) with the (EU).42   
2.3.1 The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)  
Figure no. (5) 
(GAFTA) Members 
 
The origin of the (GAFTA) could be stretched back to year 1981, when 
the Arab League states adopted an Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Inter-
Arab-Trade (AFDIAT). The (AFDIAT) was designed to liberalize trade 
exchange among Arab countries from various charges and restrictions imposed 
on it.43 However, some analysts argue that the (AFDIAT) was somehow vague in 
its language, and most importantly it didn't set a clear determination mechanism 
regarding the selection of covered products.  
                                                 
42  Ibid.  
43  See Article II, Formal Text of Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab States.  
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It was only until 1997 when the Social and Economic Council of the Arab 
League adopted a declaration for establishing an "Executive Program" for the 
(AFDIAT), which then became the formal text of the (GAFTA). The (GAFTA) 
required that "all Arab goods traded among the party-states shall be 
liberalized in accordance with the gradual liberalization principle which 
shall be applied as of January 1, 1998 ", allowing for "full liberalization" 
by July 21, 2007(17). In 2002, the Arab League's Economic and Social Council 
resolved to accelerate the gradual liberalization process, abolishing tariffs by 
January 1, 2005.44 Currently, the (GAFTA) includes in its membership 17 Arab 
countries as follow:  
1. Jordan 7. Morocco 13. Kuwait 
2. United Arab Emirates 8. Syria 14. Tunis 
3. Bahrain 9. Lebanon 15. Libya 
4. Saudi Arabia 10. Iraq 16. Sudan 
5. Oman 11. Egypt 17. Yemen 
6. Qatar 12. Palestine  
 
 (GAFTA) is regarded as one of the most important economic 
achievements in the area of Arab cooperative working. It contributes to efforts 
toward establishing the Arab Common Market. As of January 1st, 2005, the 
agreement reached full trade liberalization of goods, through the full exemption 
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect among Arab member 
countries.  
The agreement provided special preferential treatment for less developed 
member countries, where both Sudan and Yemen had longer period of 
liberalization to reach full exemption by the end of 2010, while Palestine has 
                                                 
44  See Article 2.1 of the (GAFTA).  
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been exempted from tariff reductions due to its geopolitical situation. 
Agricultural products were provided special treatment, where each country 
could exclude at most 10 agricultural products from the agreement during the 
harvest season. In addition, rules of origins were set at 40% local content of the 
value added. 
Trade statistics show that intra (GAFTA) exports increased at a faster 
rate than world exports especially during the period (1997-2005). (Figure no.6) 
shows that intra (GAFTA) exports increased by a yearly average of (15%), while 
world exports increased by (8%) only.  
(Figure no.6) 
Intra (GAFTA) Exports versus World Exports (1993-2005) 
 
Source: United Nations (2007) and WTO (2007). 
Moreover, it is striking to observe that intra (GAFTA) exports have 
increased slightly higher than extra-exports, where the later recorded (14%) as a 
yearly average growth especially during the last period (Figure no.7).   
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 (Figure no.7) 
Intra and Extra (GAFTA) Exports (1993-2005) 
 
Source: United Nations (2007) and WTO (2007 
 
 
Generally, it is also worth noting that the (GAFTA) is characterized with 
a high degree of  trade concentration along the  grouped countries level, where 
up to year 2005 the group of Gulf countries captured about (70%) of total intra 
(GAFTA) trade, whereas Mashrek countries only reached (20%) and Maghreb 
countries barely contributed by (10%).  
Consequently, the following table (table no.1) exhibits a further major 
feature regarding trade balance within the (GAFTA), where up to year 2005 
Saudi Arabia alone captured (36.6%) of total exports, achieving a remarkable 
surplus of (7,300 million US dollars). On the other hand, the UAE captured 
(22.3%) of total imports recording the largest deficit of (2,700 million US 
dollars), followed by Bahrain (1,700 million US dollars).  
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(Table no. 1) 
Intra (GAFTA) Trade (Trade Balance- 2005) 
 
 Source: United Nations (2007) 
 
In all, the (GAFTA) is a successful step along the right track of regional 
economic integration within the Arab World. It managed to tackle some 
important topics such as the roles of origin, dispute settlement mechanism and 
full liberalization of trade in goods. However, its sustainable progress is mainly 
correlated with certain crucial topics such as trade in services, treatment of free 
zones products and harmonization of standards and metrology among member 
countries.  
2.3.2 The Agadir Agreement     
 Unlike most –if not all- of the previous both regional and sub-regional 
economic integration attempts within the (MENA) region in general and the 
Arab world in particular, the main motivations for The Agadir Agreement were 
highly driven by out-ward purposes rather than in-ward ones. The idea of better 
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reaping of potential benefits from the Northern Mediterranean States – the 
(EU)-, was mainly dominating the intentions of the member states of the Agadir 
Agreement.    
The origin of the Agreement goes back to an earlier declaration of intent 
among member countries in 2001; it was signed in Morocco in 2004 and entered 
into force in 2006. The Agreement established a free trade area among four 
southern Mediterranean countries, mainly Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
The Agreement was greatly perceived as a forward remarkable step towards the 
conclusion of a "Euro-Mediterranean regional free trade area" by 2010. The 
creation of a "Euro-Mediterranean free trade area" by 2010 is one of the targets 
set by the Barcelona Declaration.45  
Despite the fact that the Agadir Agreement left the door open for 
accession by other Arab states, a major necessary condition of being a partner of 
an (FTA) with the (EU) still remained to be fulfilled. A further distinction 
between the Agadir Agreement and the (GAFTA) is primary related to the scope 
and coverage, where the Agadir Agreement is calling for the liberalization of 
trade in goods, services and movement of human and capital, recording the 
second distinguished comprehensive initiative among the (MENA) region after 
the (GCC) model. 
A remarkable importance of the Agadir Agreement lies at the increasing 
potentiality of reaping extra benefits of the (EU) cumulating rules of origin, 
which would enable the Agreement's member states to manufacture jointly, and 
then export the final products to the (EU) market. Cumulation holds that inputs 
                                                 
45  Ibid.  
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from preferential trading partners can be used in the production of a final good 
without undermining the origin of the product.46  
Accordingly, an Egyptian manufacturer may use (import) any raw 
materials or intermediate components along the production process from any 
other member states in the Agreement, without running the risk of losing 
preferential access if the final product to be exported within the area (mainly 
EU).     
2.4. Regionalism Implications: Opportunities and Challenges    
As far as the previous initiatives of both regional and sub-regional 
integration within the (MENA) region are concerned, it is worth mentioning that 
Inter-trade liberalization among the (MENA) countries was only one feature of 
such initiatives. In other words, evidences show that several economic 
externalities extended beyond the boundaries of goods trade to capture as 
relevant factors as labor mobility, capital flows and infrastructure links.  
In terms of labor mobility, the (MENA) region is regarded as more 
integrated through labor mobility than trade and investment (Figure no. 8). 
Comparing with approximately (5%) representing the region's share of global 
trade, the (MENA) countries originate about (16%) of all remittances paid out to 
migrants in the world, and (10%) of global remittances are received by residents 
of (MENA) countries. 
 
 
  
                                                 
46  Rajan Sudesh Ratna, "GSTP Rules of Origin- Developing Country's Perspective.  
      www.unctadxi.org/secured/GSTP/Articles.  
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 (Figure no. 8) 
(MENA)’s share in world trade, FDI, and remittances paid & received 
 
 
       Source: Based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007b). 
 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that despite the high degree of integration 
among labor mobility within the (MENA) region, it is recognized as 
unbalanced.47 The following table (table no. 2) shows that (MENA) countries 
originated about half the migrants to Maghreb countries, whereas the Mashreq 
countries received about (25%) from the (MENA) countries, mirroring the 
increasing share of non-(MENA) sources of migration for the Mashreq. On the 
contrary, the (MENA) region captured about (56%) of migrants originating in 
the Mashreq, whereas the region captured only (9%) of migrants from the 
Maghreb countries, stressing the importance of the (EU) as a preferred 
destination.48    
 
                                                 
47  World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, 2008 Economic Developments and Prospects: 
"Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness".  
48  Note: Maghreb includes Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya; GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; Mashreq includes 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza; while “other” refers to Egypt, Djibouti, 
Iran, and Yemen. 
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 (Table no. 2) 
(MENA) Labor Mobility Integration 
 
Source: (Ratha and Shaw 2007)http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances 
  
  
Regarding capital flows, two major factors have been positively 
coincidently with latest regional and sub-regional initiatives within the (MENA) 
region, such factors could be traced clearly along both the demand side and the 
supply side as well. On one hand, the demand side, a wide range of the (MENA) 
countries did witness increasing improvements among the public sector, through 
realistic series of structural reforms.  
On the other hand- the supply side-, the various waves of the oil booms 
witnessed by the (GCC) countries in particular resulted in a plenty of liquidity to 
be invested, where several other (MENA) countries did capture a considerable 
share. Investors from the (GCC) were showing interest in stocks of non- (GCC) 
countries, aiming at benefiting from the privileges provided by regional 
agreements, and utilizing the upside potential in these markets as well. Statistics 
43 
 
show that market capitalization in (MENA) countries increased from only (13%) 
of GDP a decade ago to (50%) by (2005). 49    
As the pace of regionalism within the (MENA) region got intensified over 
the last five decades, a truly "spaghetti bowl" of interlinked relationships and 
overlapping associations has been inevitable. The following figure (Figure no. 9) 
shows that almost every (MENA) country is at least involved in one regional 
economic agreement, while many others are partners of several regional 
integration agreements. 
(Figure no.9) 
MENA's Spaghetti Bowl –Network of Regional Agreements   
 
    Source: World Bank Staff, 2008  
 
However, some analysts view the results as insufficient. According to 
(Achy 2006; Peridy 2005; Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef 2004) gravity models 
estimating trade potentials among partner countries based on economic size, 
                                                 
49  Ibid.  
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geographic distance and other country characteristics consistently find that 
(MENA) integration is below the level expected.50  
Several views appear to be plausible reasons for the limited (frustrated) 
harvest of (MENA)'s regionalism. On one hand, trade within sub-regional blocks 
appears to be low.51 The following table (table no. 3) shows that none of the four 
members of the (Agadir) agreement trades more than (3%) of total imports and 
exports with the other three partners. The same observation holds for the five 
members of the Arab Maghreb Union, with only Tunisia showing a somewhat 
higher level of regional integration.  
 (Table no. 3) 
(MENA)'s Level of Trade with Partners in Regional & Sub-regional Agreements* 
 
*Note: Merchandise imports and exports with partners as a share of total merchandise trade (%) 
  Source: World Bank staff estimates based on IMF Directions of Trade database. 
In this regard, the fact of insufficient trade complementarities stands to 
be strong justification for weak trade –goods market- integration across the 
                                                 
50  See Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, "The Arab Economies In A Changing World", 2007, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, www.piie.com.   
51  Ibid.  
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(MENA) region.52 As a matter of fact countries with similar resources, 
production capabilities, and export structures face difficulties in utilizing 
regional integration, in terms of establishing patterns of specialization and 
diversification. 
 According to (Yeats 1998; Khandelwal 2004) the degree of similarities 
between the export structure of one country and the import basket of another 
can be analyzed by using the bilateral product complementary index. The value 
of this index can range from zero, which represents no complementary between 
exports and imports of two countries, to 100, which implies a perfect match. The 
higher the index between two countries, the greater the product 
complementary.53 
The following table (table no. 4) shows that bilateral complementarity 
among (MENA) countries is relatively low as the index54 rarely exceeds an 
indicator value of 20. A remarkable result is achieved by Bahrain, which as an 
importer shows very strong complementarity with other fuel exporters in the 
region. 55 
 
 
                                                 
52  Ibid. 
53  Jean Jacques Hallaert, " Can Regional Integration Accelerate Development in Africa?", IMF 
Working       Paper, March 2007.  
54 Note: Indexes calculated at the Harmonized System six-digit level. The product complementarity 
index Cjk between two countries j and k is defined as Cjk = 100 - Σi (|Mik - Xij |/2), where Xij 
represents the share of good i in total exports of country j, and Mik represents the share of good in total 
imports of country k. Indexes for Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) were not computed because of lack of detailed trade data. 
Egypt was not included, as the country reports trade data in the Standard International Trade 
Classification. 
55  Ibid.  
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 (Table no. 4) 
Bilateral Trade Complementarity in (MENA), 2006  
 
Source: World Bank estimates based on UN Comtrade data 
 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that complementarity indexes among 
partners in successful regional agreements, such as the (EU) or the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have been reported to exceed a 
value of 50, and moderately successful ones, such as (Mercosur), show 
complementarity indexes in the range of 25–30. 56 
According to (Fawzy-2003), unbalanced levels of import protection across 
the (MENA) region resulted in further obstacles toward better reaping the 
benefits of regional integration. Differences in tariffs imply that industries in 
partner countries benefit to a differing extent from policy-generated transfers, so 
that the costs and benefits of moving to freer trade are unevenly distributed. 57 
                                                 
56  Ibid.  
57  Ahmad Galal and Bernard Hoekman , "Arab Economic Integration: Between Hope and Reality" 
2003, Egyptian Center for Economic Studies.   
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Moreover, it is worth noting that high-protection countries could be 
adversely affected by regional integration compared with low protection ones, as 
in the case of high-protection ones –high MFN rates- the risk of trade diversion 
occurring, is further increased if the intensity of trade is low between partners 
prior to bilateral liberalization, as it is the case in the (MENA) region. The idea is 
that maintaining high (MFN) tariffs is associated with a high risk of 
economically costly trade diversion occurring from preferential integration. In 
particular, selective opening towards regional partners can divert trade flows 
from more efficient third-country producers to less efficient partner-country 
producers, resulting in a loss of tariff revenues without the economy benefiting 
from lower purchasing costs. 58  
The following figure (Figure no. 10) shows that the simple average of 
(MFN) duties in the (MENA) countries ranges from a low level of (5%) in the 
(GCC) and Lebanon to a relatively medium level of (10% - 15%) as in Libya, 
Syria, Jordan and Egypt, exceeding the edge of (20%) as in Iran, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. Virtually all countries within the region have reduced their tariffs over 
the past decade, and many of them to a significant extent. As a result, the 
MENA-wide duty average has been converging toward the world average.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58  Ibid.  
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(Figure no. 10) 
Ranges of (MFN) Duties Across (MENA) Region 
 
       Source: World Bank staff estimates based on IMF Trade Restrictiveness database. 
 
 While the (MENA) region did achieve tangible progress along its pace of 
regional integration in terms of quantitative restrictions – tariff reductions-, non-
tariff barriers appear to capture an increasingly concerns among (MENA)'s 
modern regional integration pace, where policy makers are exerting enormous 
efforts to remove discriminatory regulations, improve customs procedures and 
reduce transport costs. Analysts argue that (MENA) countries face substantial 
challenges in this area owing to an inheritance of restrictive nontariff measures 
and neglect of trade-facilitating efforts.  
The situation is captured in recent analytical work. In particular, this 
issue was further elaborated in a recent analytical work, in which a team of 
analysts in the World Bank’s Development Research Group has estimated an 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2005). It turns 
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out that nontariff barriers to trade are more substantial in the (MENA) region 
than in any other region of the world. Also, nontariff barriers contribute more to 
overall trade restrictiveness. 59 
The following figure (Figure no. 11) shows that nontariff barriers are 
much more restricted in the case of (MEAN) labor-abundant countries 
compared with resource-rich labor-importing ones. However, all in all the 
(MENA) region did pose higher restricted nontariff measures compared with 
other regions in the world such as East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean and even Sub-Saharan Africa.  
(Figure no. 11) 
Nontariff measures in MENA countries 
 
   Source: World Bank staff estimates based on Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2005. 
 
According to (Filali -2007), despite the launch of preferential tariff 
reductions among the (GAFTA) members since 2005, some importing countries 
have asked exporters from partner countries to obtain special import permits, 
that had to be presented to the border agencies in order to benefit from the 
                                                 
59  Hiau Kee, Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga "Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices" 
January 2008, Development Research Group, The World Bank.  
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preferences. Hence, the reduced-tariff-preferences exist only on paper, but not in 
practice.60 
A major common factor among (MENA)'s regional integration initiatives, 
is the limited achievement (integration) within trade in services. It has been 
argued that intraregional differences in regulations, restrictions on currency 
convertibility, and limits on the physical movement of individuals have generally 
resulted in a situation, where (MENA) countries' service providers often found it 
easier to operate in regions outside the region (for example: Western Europe) 
rather than within it. 61  
However, it should be noted that the (MENA) region do pose quite 
potential significant opportunities for an intensive (deep) regional integration 
within the services sector. On one hand, the following figure (Figure no. 12) 
shows a dynamic promising path of services exports for selected (MENA) 
countries, while (figure no. 13) depicts the potential complementarity between 
net exporters of services in labor-abundant countries and net importers in 
resource-rich countries. 62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60  Ibid.  
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62  Ibid.  
51 
 
(Figure no. 12) 
Exports of Services for selected (MENA) Countries 
 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on IMF Balance of Payment statistics. 
 
(Figure no. 13) 
MENA countries’ net services trade position, 2006 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on IMF Balance of Payment statistics 
 
 
 
52 
 
Chapter Three: Concluding Remarks  
3.1 Main Findings 
 Economic integration is generally defined as the process of eliminating 
(reducing) barriers –mainly economic ones- between two or more economies. 
The paper listed a number of similarities between past versus current waves of 
economic integration. With technological advances continue to play an 
important role in facilitating global integration as in the past waves, both  
current supporting government policies coupled with supporting institutional 
framework appear to be a similar driving force as in the past. Moreover, social 
opposition to rapid economic integration continued to be major similarity.  
On the other hand, the paper showed a considerable set of distinctions 
between past versus current waves of economic integration. With the increasing 
intra-trade's share of world trade over extra-trade's share records a remarkable 
characteristic of current waves of economic integration, the insignificance of the  
traditional distinction between the core (hub) and the periphery (margin), is 
greatly recognized as a further feature of current waves of economic integration,  
as the mature industrial economies (mainly North America and European 
Union) and the emerging-market economies (China, India and Brazil) are  
becoming more integrated and interdependent.      
 The paper showed that the process of economic integration could be 
deepening either vertically through the gradual evolution from (FTAs) to (CUs) 
to (CMs), or horizontality via enlarging the scope of coverage to include trade in 
goods, trade in services and movement of labor and capital. Despite the fact that 
economic integration is usually defined as a systematic staged process, in 
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practice, formal agreements rarely fall neatly into one of the traditional forms 
(stages) of economic integration, resulting in some confusion regarding both the 
terminologies and the conditions of economic integration.  
This situation is best described by both (NAFTA) and (EC), where the 
first merges several conditions of both (FTAs) and (CUs) simultaneously, the 
second did skip the first formal stages of economic integration – namely (FTA) – 
and started directly as a (CU).  
The surge in (RTAs) has continued unabated since the early 1990s. A sum 
of 421 (RTAs) have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2008. Of 
these, 324 (RTAs) were notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 
1994; 29 under the Enabling Clause; and 68 under Article V of the GATS. At 
that same date, 230 agreements were in force. 
The legal frameworks for (RTAs) rely mainly on GATT Article (24) 
XXIV –for agreements related to trade in goods- and GATS Article (5) V – for 
agreements related to trade in services. Moreover, a wide range of preferential 
arrangements finds its legitimacy within the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) which became part of the 1979 "Enabling Clause". Those legal 
frameworks of preferentiality have marked an explicit forego (waive) over the 
heart of the GATT, which is the principle of "Non-Discrimination". 
Currently, what has been termed the "Spaghetti Bowl" of (FTAs), (CUs), 
(CMs) and an endless assortment of preferential trade deals has almost reached 
the point where (MFN) is an exceptional treatment. Certainly, the term might 
now be better defined as (LFN), Least-Favored Nation Treatment. The sluggish 
progress in multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Development Round 
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appears to be the most recent common plausible justification accelerating the 
rush to forge (RTAs). Accordingly, the unregulated proliferation of (RTAs) has 
an increasing propensity to result in vested interests, which may in turn make it 
more difficult to attain meaningful multilateral liberalization.  
In practice, evidences showed that the Doha round has witnessed the 
hesitations of many developing countries – mostly GSP beneficiaries or PTA 
recipients- to support ambitious objectives on MFN tariff reductions, which 
would erode the value of their preferences. Therefore, there is an increasing 
doubt towards the declaration that pursuing multiple (RTAs) would enhance, 
rather than undermine, the attractiveness of multilateral trade liberalization. 
In the light of the changing landscape of regionalism listed above, the 
paper argues that multilateral rules governing regionalism should continue to 
capture as much concern as possible among the (WTO)’s negotiating agendas 
and work programs. Assessing the existing patterns of regionalism in terms of 
legal compliance with stipulated legal framework is a necessary condition, but 
not a sufficient one. In other words, the paper concludes that a progressively 
systematic examination of the new characteristics of regionalism should be 
further developed, besides well prepared outlook in terms of whether the 
ongoing architecture of regionalism is more or less likely to foster 
multilateralization in the future. 
The increasing recognition of the link between preferentiality and 
regional arrangements has led most nations to become more engaged in 
regionalism. The (MENA) region has economic, geographical, and cultural 
elements that provide a favorable context for deep regional economic 
integration. The paper showed that efforts to integrate regionally were started 
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mostly earlier than in any other developing region in the world. All countries in 
the region have concluded numerous bilateral agreements to reduce trade 
barriers on a preferential basis and further profound existing ones as well.  
Accordingly, and as efforts to promote such deeper integration are 
capturing importance, and the model of open regionalism— based on the use of 
regional preferences as stepping stones for global integration and 
competitiveness—is getting the improved attention of policy makers; it is worth 
noting that the paper dealt with regionalism not only as a package of preferential 
arrangements but also as a vehicle of fostering the flow of investments, capital 
and labor.  
In this context, the paper partially concluded that regionalism did act 
significantly as a vehicle of facilitating the region's integration. More specifically, 
it should be mentioned that despite the existence of many factors hampering 
intra regional integration (among which differences in per capita income, lack of 
product differentiation, homogeneity of exports and geographical features) the 
proportion of intra-MENA trade within subgroups is significantly higher than 
overall intra-MENA trade. Nearly 2/3 of Maghreb trade with the Arab world 
goes to other Maghreb countries; GCC countries capture 75% of GCC trade and 
1/3 of Mashreq trade goes to other Mashreq countries.  
The general impression, however, is that intraregional trade is low 
compared with its potential and with levels achieved by economic blocs 
elsewhere in the world. For example, intraregional merchandise exports among 
(GAFTA) members is about (9%) of total bloc exports. This is much less than the 
levels achieved by blocs such as (NAFTA) and (ASEAN), although it is 
comparable to the levels achieved by other blocs, such as the Southern Cone 
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Common Market (Mercosur) and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA). 
While the paper did add to the literatures emphasizing the significance of 
regionalism as a vehicle of facilitating the region's integration both internally 
and externally, the accessible evidences are rather confusing regarding the 
question of whether intra-regional trade flows are lower than what would be 
expected given the region's fundamentals. On one hand, simple shares and trade 
intensity indices suggest that intra-regional trade is not that low and has been 
expanding. On the other hand, the gravity regressions suggest that trade is less 
than what would be expected. However, there has been a noticeable change in 
the last 10 years, with trade now being larger than what the standard gravity 
model would predict.  
The paper concluded that the gains from regional movements within the 
region were not equally distributed/utilized among/by the different dimensions; 
where the region is regarded as more integrated through labor mobility than 
trade and investment. Comparing with approximately (5%) representing the 
region's share of global trade, the (MENA) countries originate about (16%) of all 
remittances paid out to migrants in the world, and (10%) of global remittances 
are received by residents of (MENA) countries.  
  The paper showed that the low levels of intraregional goods trade can be 
explained partly by the lack of complementarity in production and trade 
structures across the region. Bilateral complementarity indexes show that the 
match between desired imports and available exports within the region is 
generally poor and remains significantly below the level found in successful 
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regional communities. Besides, the uneven level of import protection across the 
(MENA) region did create a further obstacle to smooth integration. 
Moreover, the paper agreed with the findings that existing regional 
integration agreements within the (MENA) region generally do cover trade in 
services marginally, through “intentions of cooperation” in certain services 
sectors. Intraregional differences in regulations, restrictions on currency 
convertibility, and limits on the physical movement of individuals are currently 
creating a situation in which it is often easier for (MENA) countries’ service 
providers to operate in countries outside the region (e.g., Western Europe) than 
within. Given the dynamic development of services exports, as well as the 
complementarity of net services exporters in labor-abundant countries with net 
importers in resource-rich countries, significant opportunities could exist for 
increased regional exchange. 
The paper argues that regional agreements within the (MENA) region 
have further facilitated the launch of intraregional investments, which are widely 
believed to bring the region's countries more economically closer together, 
through the creation of business linkages with an increasing concern in 
successful reciprocal exchange. Meanwhile, taking into consideration the 
reasonable level of the region's integration via capital movements, some FDI 
might generate additional links by stimulating the emergence of cross-country 
networks of suppliers. Evidences showed that over the past two decades, such 
networks have been established in the car industry in Eastern Europe and in 
electronics in East Asia, and have significantly contributed to the international 
economic success of these regions.  
58 
 
Thus, the paper agreed with the findings of (Haddad 2007) that the 
systems of interrelated suppliers would take advantage of inter-country wage 
differentials within the region, short transport distances, and economies of scale 
from specialization. Accordingly, the resulting fragmentation of production 
would intensify intraregional trade, and it tends to depend heavily on extra-
regional demand for final goods as well. Hence, a vital approach for successful 
utilization of regional movements would stake to the following: 
• Closer integration of factor and product markets to facilitate the 
emergence of production linkages within the region. 
• Parallel openness towards international markets. 
• Well established compensation schemes, as such production 
networks would result in winners and losers.  
• Well designed complementary reforms.   
 
3.2 The Way Ahead 
As far as regional integration within the (MENA) region is concerned, 
and taking into consideration the remarkable achievements on the regional track 
utilized by the region so far, and despite the fact of limited exposure of trade in  
services in existing regional movements, coupled with high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in some countries, and given the lengthy, costly and ambiguous 
prospective of the multilateral agenda, the paper do conclude that the regional 
choice for the region's future integration is inevitable.   
Our conclusion stakes not only to economic argument listed so far, but 
also to non-economic aspects of regional integration, such as enhancing security 
and facilitating cultural exchange, which would serve as plausible justifications. 
Moreover, the paper underscores a wide range of in-ward oriented motivations, 
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and varieties of out-ward empowered ones as well; US-Middle East trade 
relations and EU-Middle East trade relations. In other words, the possibility of 
going more regionalism would even get more preferable especially in the light of 
the ongoing negotiations with both the United States and the (EU), with whom 
trade liberalization seems more attractive due to their financial support offered 
to foster (MENA)'s trade reforms, and prevent the appearance of the “hub and 
spoke” mechanisms (when speaking about sub-regional FTA’s). 
Examining the latter justification reveals clearly how much regionalism is 
further biased to dominate within the region's trade atmosphere. On one hand, 
exploring the major features of trade relations between the (EU) and the 
(MENA) region reflects explicitly that the regional approach lies at the heart of 
this front rather than the multilateral one. The realistic launch of regional 
movements between the two partners goes back to year 1995 (Barcelona 
Conference), where all (MENA) Mediterranean countries, with the exception of 
Libya, were encouraged to initiate trade negotiations with the (EU) and 
ultimately replaced their Cooperation Agreements of the 1970s with the more 
comprehensive Association Agreements.  
Such step was part of a more comprehensive initiative aimed at achieving 
an (FTA) by 2010. Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia were the first to ratify the 
agreement, and by 2007 they had reduced or abolished their tariffs on most 
European industrial goods entering their respective markets. Egypt started 
reducing its tariffs on EU imports in 2004, and in January 2007 it initiated the 
reduction on goods listed under Annex III of its agreement. Lebanon started the 
process of dismantlement in 2008. 
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This conclusion goes in line with the findings the paper showed before, 
where (MENA) countries have also looked toward Europe for both financial and 
technical support through action plans in the context of a broader European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). These country-specific action plans lay out strategic 
objectives of cooperation between the EU and the MENA signatories, linking 
economic, political, and institutional reforms in MENA to receive greater 
financial assistance and enhanced market access to the EU. Accordingly, the 
creation of recent forms of sub-regional movements within the region, such as 
the Aghadir Agreement, was highly perceived as an enabling gateway for 
preferential market access to the (EU).  
On the other hand, our conclusion is further supported through the US-
MENA trade front, where in may 2003 the Bush administrative –US former 
president- promised to launch new bilateral free trade agreements with Middle 
Eastern countries, pursuant to the creation of a comprehensive US-Middle East 
FTA (MEFTA) over the following decade. The US administration emphasized 
that the (MEFTA) is an ultimate goal to be achieved within a decade, through a 
series of regional preferential measures; those US measures extend to include 
negotiating new Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), 
launching Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ), as an efficient facilitating 
preferential trade arrangements toward the fulfillment of higher form of 
preferential trade, i.e. Negotiating comprehensive (FTAs) that could be 
combined into other sub-regional initiatives.  
In practice, Agreements with the United States have already been signed 
by Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain in 2001, 2006 and 2006 respectively, with one 
for Oman still pending and another for the United Arab Emirates under 
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preparation. Jordan’s qualified industrial zone (QIZ) with the United States 
(offering duty-, quota-, and tax-free access to U.S. goods with both Jordanian 
and Israeli value added) has helped raise manufacturing exports, and a similar 
(QIZ) protocol was recently put in place in Egypt. Consequently, the opportunity 
for cheaper Turkish inputs in the production of textiles destined to European 
markets has also triggered a number of bilateral trade agreements between 
Turkey and MENA economies. 
Additionally, a decisive parameter in shaping the way ahead is greatly 
determined through accession procedures and conditions. Such parameter is an 
important issue for both non-members and members of regional groups within 
the (MENA) region. According to (Alabdulrazzaq and Srinivasan, 2006) the fact 
that (GCC) does not have an accession procedure has been a factor impeding 
efforts by Yemen to join the group. More generally, there are questions 
associated with relative costs and benefits of sub-regional groups accession 
mechanisms for non-members. The paper argues that such costs and benefits 
compare with accession to the (WTO) and whether and how the two complement 
each other do matter significantly. 
  The above findings mirror clearly how much regionalism is advocated in 
the coming future. Therefore, the paper believes it is highly advisable for 
(MENA) policy makers to focus first and foremost on how to deepen their 
existing regional agreements, before considering the choice between going 
further regionalism or multilateralism, and what contributions each approach 
could make toward the end of realistic feasible integration. 
   The paper concludes that deep regional linkages do have a constructive 
role to play. On one hand, preferential opening of markets can help export-
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oriented firms learn how to enter foreign markets, find foreign suppliers and 
customers, and build up economies of scale, that can subsequently be put to good 
use in global markets as well. Conversely, import-competing firms can be 
exposed to foreign competition initially on a limited intraregional basis, which 
might force them to upgrade their performance, prepare them for the fierce 
competition in the global market following subsequent, more comprehensive 
trade policy reforms. 63 
(MENA) regional movements would also provide a training ground for 
policy makers and senior officials, who can obtain experience in negotiating 
highly technical aspects of the trade policy environment, such as rules of origin, 
and learn how to engage in common rulemaking. Developing such skills before 
entering into policy reform discussions with major players, such as the (EU) or 
the United States, or even in the context of multilateral (WTO) negotiations, is 
likely to result in outcomes that correspond more closely to domestic interests.  
However, it is worth emphasizing that well-designed regional agreements 
are of limited value if they are not implemented. The paper did show that many 
regional agreements in (MENA) look stronger on paper than in practice. One 
major impediment to effective implementation is the proliferation of agreements. 
If different regional initiatives have different sector and product coverage, 
different liberalization schedules, and different rules of origin, implementation 
agencies, such as customs, might not have the capacity to put the agreement 
provisions into practice. 
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"Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness". 
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 There is often also a lack of trust and commitment— on both the export 
side, for example, with respect to the credibility of certificates of origin, and the 
import side, for example, with regard to discretionary application of 
administrative rules and requirements—that hampers proper implementation. 
Hence, well-functioning monitoring mechanisms and sustained high-level 
political attention to institutional improvements (such as those concerning 
reductions in tariff and behind-the-border barriers) are essential for the success 
of regional integration initiatives.  
Finally, taking into consideration the increasing proliferation of regional 
initiatives within the (MENA) region, analysts are becoming much more worried 
about the consequences of such proliferation on the multilateral agenda. 
Therefore, the paper concludes that it is urgently demanding to recall the so-
called "Multilateralising Regionalism" within the region. Literatures have 
shown that there are some scopes for disciplines to promote the sociability of 
regional initiatives within the multilateral trading system. . Arguably, there is 
additional room for the (WTO) to scrutinize regional regulatory initiatives. It 
could further promote the transparency of such initiatives, establish additional 
principles that ensure their openness to initially excluded countries and promote 
templates for regulatory cooperation that lend themselves to eventual 
multilateralization. 64      
It is not surprising that negotiations on procedures and disciplines on 
(RTAs) were included in the Doha Mandate. The new Transparency mechanism 
agreed in December 2006 was the first product of that. Consolidation of multiple 
                                                 
64  Jim Rollo, "The Challenge of Negotiating RTA’s for Developing Countries: what could the WTO do 
to Help?" Paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism Sponsored and 
organized by WTO, 2007 
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and overlapping (FTAs) into a single comprehensive (FTA) can help alleviate the 
harmful “noodle bowl” effects of different rules of origin and standards. The 
concept of multilateralizing regionalism has widely been examined in several 
regions of the world such as Americas and Asia, however, little has been tailored 
for (MENA)'s perspective.  
------------ 
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